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ABSTRACT 
The oil and gas industry is complicated, with significant investment characteristics and high 
operating risks, including investment failure and safety risks. This industry differs from others in that 
each company must complete a step-by-step process, starting with exploration, development, and 
production (exploitation) and ending with cost recovery, production, and taxation. Prospective 
investors must understand the risk levels associated with each of these points. Since 2007, the 
Kurdistan Region's oil and gas sector has grown rapidly, and this period has been dubbed as 
"Kurdistan's Golden Age."  As a new oil-exporting region, the income from oil is of great importance 
in the development of the country. Presently, several oil and gas exploration and production 
companies operate in the Kurdistan Region, attracting a growing number of investors. However, the 
purpose of this study is to better understand what Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) are, including 
related terms, Cost Recovery, tax processes, and areas that must be addressed in a PSC; as well as to 
discuss aspects of interest to tax administration, such as the Kurdistan region's Oil PSC's cost 
recovery issue, and to make comparisons with other developing countries such as Nigeria and 
Azerbaijan.The findings suggest that Kurdistan region PSC appears to be more favorable to 
International Oil Company (IOC) in comparison to Nigeria and Azerbaijan. As a result, a plan should 
be put in place to address the issues that would arise as a result of cost recovery and taxation in 
PSCs.   The methodology included desk research, which included a review of published literature. 
Based on the comparative assessment, the paper reached possible conclusions regarding oil cost 
recovery and fiscal regimes for the respective countries, and made some recommendations for 
upcoming oil contracts in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). 
Key Words: Iraqi Kurdistan Region and Oil contracts, Taxation, Cost Recovery, Production Sharing 
contracts,  
Introduction  
The Production Sharing Contract (PSC) is a unique petroleum agreement that many developing 
countries have followed in the exploration and production of their petroleum resources because it 
guarantees the state's sovereign right over these resources while also meeting their economic needs 
by supplying capital and technology for their production.The host government or one of its 
departments, such as the national oil company, has historically represented the state (National Oil 
Company). The government assumes little or no risk in the development of its petroleum resource 









.The primary goals of using a PSC are to attract international oil companies 
and bring foreign capital into oil producing countries, as well as to benefit from modern technology 




PSCs were first introduced in Indonesia in 1966 under which the state, as the owner of mineral 
resources, employs a IOCs to provide technical and financial support for exploration and production 
activities
3
.If commercial quantities of oil and gas are discovered, the IOCs receives an entitlement to 
a defined share of the oil produced as compensation for the risk taken and services provided, such as 
cost recovery and percentage of share. The state, on the other hand, retains ownership of the 
petroleum produced, subject only to the contractor's right to a portion of the output.
4
  Therefore, PSC 
can be distinguished from other forms of contracts in two ways. To begin with, the IOC bears the 
entire exploration risk, and the company is not compensated if no oil is found. Second, the 
government owns both the resource and the installations. In its most basic form, a PSC has four main 
characteristics. The government receives a royalty on gross production from the international partner. 
After deducting the royalty, the IOC is entitled to a pre-determined percentage of output for cost 
recovery, such as 40% in the case of KRI. The remainder of the production, known as benefit oil, is 
then split evenly between the government and IOC (for instance 65 percent for the government and 
35 percent for the IOC). The contractor would then pay income tax on its benefit oil share.
5
 
Consequently, international oil companies do, in practice, face the greatest risk in production sharing 
contracts, but at the same time oil contracts are more favourable for them, because these contracts 
provide a framework for a maximum level of cost recovery and oil production. 
In recent years, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has been one of the most active areas for onshore 
oil and gas exploration. The KRI has signed over 50 PSCs with international oil companies (IOCs) to 
date, demonstrating that it is one of the world's youngest region with significant natural resource 
reserves, especially oil and gas. As a result, the Kurdistan parliament passed Oil and Gas Law No. 28 
in 2007, adopting PSC as the preferred form of oil contract to use when contracting with IOCs.  KRI 
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is currently ranked 8th in terms of gas reserves and 13th in terms of oil reserves among the world's 
most prominent oil countries and presently  produces about 500, 000 oil barrels per day.
6
 
Economic analysis of PSC Cost Recovery and Associated Issues  
Recovering Crude oil requires surveying the area first then test wells are drilled and after that whole 
infrastructure has to be set up for production. Therefore, this process requires energy,  labour and 
more importantly appropriate funds
7
. So,in order for an oil company to be profitable, it must sell the 
oil at a price higher than these costs and in commercial quantities, which refers to the amount of 
crude oil that can theoretically be extracted at a rate that is financially feasible at the current price of 
oil. This involves oil reserves that are both producible and non-producible
8
.The procedure is referred 
to as "Cost Recovery."Cost recovery as a concept has proven to be successful, with no major 
setbacks necessitating a redesign or even a full departure in the past. Although, some scholars have 
argued that cost recovery is bad for the government, various parties have proposed a complete 
overhaul of the system, and attempts have been made to establish a new type of petroleum contract 
that does not include cost recovery but adheres to the old laws that state that all natural resources 
belong to the state
9
.Hence, as developing countries in the oil field, KRI, Nigeria, and Azerbaijan 
have adopted similar cost-recovery rules and regulations in their PSC contracts. 
Nevertheless, most of the time international oil companies do not get their expenses spent on oil 
operations in cash, but rather percentage of oil production according to lineage limited and shares in 
the contract.  In line with the bellow, percentage from KRI's PSC and other country's PSCs, 
international oil companies get different percentages from oil production in return for their expenses 
on oil operations are different from one contract to another and the disparity of shares.
10
For example, 
Article 25 of the Kurdistan PSCs, Cost provisions in which states that, the Contractor shall at all 
times be entitled to recover all Petroleum Costs incurred under this Contract, of up to (45 percent) of 
available Crude Oil (which, for the avoidance of doubt, shall apply regardless of the gravity of the 
oil) and available Associated Natural Gas, produced and saved within any Calendar Year. 
In addition, the Kurdistan RegionOil and Gas LawNo. 22 of 2007, Article 37 paragraph 6 specified 
that cost recovery from a portion of output after deduction of the Royalty is limited to a maximum of 
forty-five percent (45%) for Crude Oil and sixty percent (60%) for Natural Gas.) Production sharing 
from remaining production after Royalty and permissible cost recovery, based on a formula that 
considers total sales and cumulative petroleum costs and provides the Contractor with relatively 
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Whereas some countrieslike, Azerbaijan and Nigeria, have a significantly lower cost 
recovery rate in their production sharing agreements. For example, Nigeria offered foreign oil 
companies 30% to 40% of production in return for their costs. The Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) and Ashland Oil Company, for instance, signed a PSC in 1973 allocating "cost 
oil" at 40% of total oil output. The remaining supply is known as benefit oil, and it accounts for 45 
percent of the remaining 60 percent after subtracting the cost and tax oil. The resources will be split 
65 percent between the NNPC and Ashland. They also plan to reduce it to 25% and shift the 




Another good example is from Azerbaijan’s PSC,under section 11.2 of Cost Recovery, in which 
states that the Contractor is entitled to the following reimbursement of Petroleum Costs: I All 
operating costs must be recovered before moving on to total Production. (ii) After deducting Crude 
Oil needed to recover Contractor's Operating Costs, all Capital Costs shall be recovered from a 
maximum of fifty percent (50%) of Crude Oil left out of Total Production this is mean including 
“Capital Cost Recovery Petroleum" and that also has to comply with international accounting 
standards
13
. Therefore, from above observation one can argue it is necessary for the Kurdistan region 
to reconsider the idea of cost recovery at this time
14
.To begin with, allowing up to 45-50 percent 
from the initial stage of production and sixty percent (60%) for Natural Gas to be taken by foreign oil 
companies in exchange for their crude oil production cost, is excessive
15
; when compared to nations 
like Nigeria and Azerbaijan. So, when the cost of oil is high and the price is low, as it is today, it 
causes financial issues and shortages in nations that rely heavily on oil sales, such as KRI, which is 
experiencing financial issues in addition to all oil sales.Second, the expenditures of those IOCs 
should be regulated by an executive committee, which should not allow them to waste money on 
useless goods or imports of products that are widely available on the market at the expense of oil 
recovery or imported expenses. 
Finally, the committee should have the authority to review and balance price differences in other 
available states or near the importing country for goods that are imported in order to comply with the 
standard cost price of any manufactured items, or even reject any expenditure that is not normally 
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considered to be cost-recoverable, such as experts' personal pleasure or entertainment that is not 
normally considered to be cost-recoverable. As a result, the committee should be skilled 
investigators who can go over the case in detail and come up with a solution. 
First of all, I think it is too much to grant the right to recover 50 percent of cost recovery when we 
have many other countries close by that allow much less to be recovered as cost recovery. For 
example, production sharing contracts signed by Qatar and Oman, in exchange for their expenses, 
gave 40 percent of production to international oil companies, while Egypt gave between 30 percent 
and 40 percent to international oil companies.Thirdly, the  main goals of  using a  production  
sharing contractistoattract  international  oil  
companiesto  bring  foreign capitalinto  oil producing countries  and  tobenefitfrom  modern  
technology  whichis  not  availablein  oil  producing  countries  for  oil  operations  (Ernest& 
John, 2000, P.44 
However,ifinternational  oil  companieshave  explored  the  crude  oil  and  do  all  other  
operations  suchas  production  and  marketing,  international  oil  companieswillgettheir 
expensesandcostsbackin  kind.  Accordingly,  international  oil  companiesreceivetheir 
expensesthatare  spent  on  oil  operation  whenthereis a  commercial exploration and not the 
contrary, sothereis no negotiation on the failureconferthiscontract. 
Furthermore, most of the time international oil companies do not gettheirexpenses spent on  
oil operations incash, but some percentage of oil production accordingtolineagelimitedand 
sharesin the contract. 
Inlinewith  the  above,  the  percentagewhich  international  oil  companies  getfrom  oil  
production  inreturnfortheirexpenses  on oil  operations aredifferentfrom  one contractto 
another  and  the  disparity  of  shares.Forinstance,  production  sharing  contracts  signed  by  
QatarandOmangave 40% of the production to international oil companiesinreturnfortheir 
expenses,while  Egypt  gave  between  30%  to40%to  international  oil  companies  (Egypt  
Official newspaper, No 26, 1988).  
An Overview ofKurdistan Region PSC Tax Provisions and its Implications 
This section aims to provide readers with a greater understanding of KRI's PSC, tax strategies and 
difficulties relating to tax administration and tax-related issues that occur as a result of production 
sharing contracts by using examples from other developing countries such as Nigeria and 







Azerbaijan.16During the previous 15 years, PSCs between the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) and international oil corporations (IOCs) have highlighted the KRG and Iraqi Federal 
Government's (IFG) relationship issues. The KRG has been able to sign 50 PSCs with IOCs during 
this time without involving or obtaining permission from the central government. However, for the 
sake of this study, the author will only focus on taxes implications rather than legality
17
. 
Tax exemption under the PSC is common for oil companies, whether it is a total or partial 
exemption, temporary or permanent exemption, under a special law or a legislation that regulates the 
oil industry
18
.However, in some cases, the host countries exempt companies from all or some of the 
taxes in order to encourage foreign investment for them and for other reasons.Whereby the 
temporary exemption is exemption from taxes for a limited period of time, and with the end of that 
period the exemption ends and the company’s income returns to being subject to tax, and it is called 
holiday tax, while the permanent exemption is the absolute exemption, whether it is restricted or 
without restriction, if the permanent exemption was without restriction, then this means that the 
investor is not subject to any type of tax, but if the exemption is under restriction, the investor is 




Imposing taxes on oil companies and Restrictions 
At present, the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) does not impose any restrictions on the 
exploration, development and production of hydrocarbons (cost and profit oil) in the KRI. As per the 
PSC, the Contractor shall be entitled to receive and exportsfreely any available petroleum (cost and 
profit oil) to which it is entitled under the agreement
20
.  Except as expressly provided in Article 30 
and article 31, without prejudice to the exemptions expressly for in each contractor entity and any 
subcontractor shall, for the entire duration of this contract, be exempt from all other taxes, duties, 
levies, charges, withholdings and impositions generally applicable in the Kurdistan region, as a result 
of its activities under this contract. the government shall indemnify each contractor entity upon 
demand against any liability to pay any taxes, duties, levies, charges, impositions or withholdings 
assessed or imposed upon such entity which relate to any of the exemptions granted by the 
government under this article 31.
21
 
Furthermore, each Contractor company and any Subcontractor shall be exempt from any other taxes, 
charges, levies, and assessments for the whole length of this Contract, as mentioned particularly in 
this Article 31, and without prejudice to the exemptions specifically provided for in Article 30 and in 
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. While, on the other hand, the Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region No. 22 of 
2007 stipulated that oil companies must pay the necessary taxes in first paragraph.The Kurdistan 
legislator has identified six types of tax that must be paid under Article 40 , where it states  a 
Contractor, Authorized Person or other person associated with petroleumoperations is liable for any 
applicable taxes of the Regional Government, including: 
1) surface tax; 
2) personal income tax; 
3) corporate income tax; 
4) customs duties and any other similar taxes; 
5) windfall profits or additional profits tax; and 
6) any other tax, levy or charge expressly included in its Petroleum Contract, according to paragraph 
three of the same article, companies are obligated to pay the imposed taxes that were specified in the 
first paragraph of Article (40), which are the only taxes by the regional government that apply to oil 
operations, meaning that companies and everyone involved in oil operations are obligated to pay the 
incoming taxes unless exempted by the special law. Meanwhile, in the Kurdistan Region, there is 
only a draft tax law for oil companies for the year 2012, but the tax rate imposed therein was not 
specified, and also the Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region did not explicitly refer to Law No. 
20 of 2011 of Income Tax Law or the law No. (26)for the year 2007 in the Kurdistan Region to 
determine the rate of tax imposed on companies in which the tax rate was set at (15%) on all profits 
of companies operating in the Kurdistan Region.It would have been beneficial if the minimum 
income tax rate was determined in a progressive manner as production increased, and this percentage 
was levied on both the licensee and the main contractor, though the latter may clarify what was 
stated in clause (first) of paragraph (5) of Article 5. (5). 40) from the Kurdistan Region's oil and gas 
law, which mentions a windfall benefit tax or additional profit tax as a progressive tax whose 
percentage rises with increased production, since increased production means better income, and the 
contractor gains additional profits, making it possible to impose a tax on it
23
.  
With regard to the Kurdistan Region, the authority responsible for exempting oil companies 
operating in the Kurdistan Region is the legislative authority, such as  (Kurdistan Parliament), as it 
was stated in second Paragraph of Article (40) of the Kurdistan Region Oil and Gas Law that oil 
companies are exempted from taxes by a special law that is, according to the regular law issued by 
the legislative authority, but it did not specify the party that proposes to exempt an oil company from 
taxes, and researcher  believe that this position is criticized, and it was preferable to specify the party 
that proposes exempting oil companies from taxes, and the Council Regional Oil and Gas is could be 
the department to be entrusted with this task.Thus,the tax exemption may needs to be reconsidered in 
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theKurdistan region, since the legislator established the principle of tax exemption for oil companies 
(the contractor may be exempted from taxes in the oil contract by law).
24
Returning to the content of 
the production-sharing contracts concluded by the KRG with the oil exploration companies, 
researcher conclude that the KRG decided to exempt the oil companies that contradicted  with each 
other from all types of taxes except for the corporate income tax, personal income tax and social 
security contributions. As in the PSC contract of (Atrush) field concluded between the Kurdistan 
Regional Government and (Marathon) for the year 2010, the contractor and the subcontractor are 
exempt from all taxes, recovery and exportation, as it was stated that(1- All services, materials, 
equipment, goods, consumables and products imported into the Kurdistan region and other parts of 
Iraq by the contractor, that is, the contracting entity, its subsidiary companies, that is, the 
subcontractor ...., for use or consumption in free oil operations and is exempt from any and all taxes 
are refundable.As stated in paragraph (4) in Article (31) of the production-sharing contract between 
the regional government and (Marathon) Company for the year 2010, the contractor and the 
subcontractor are exempted from the withholding tax applied to any payments, and also in 
paragraphs (5, 6 and 7) in Article ( 31) From the same contract, the contractor (exploration 
companies) and their subsidiaries are exempted from additional profit tax, surface taxes, and windfall 
profits tax
25
.As for the value-added tax (VAT), it is imposed on companies and is not refundable, but 
it is considered as the oil cost and the oil cost is recovered by the companies. So in the end the 
companies recover the value-added tax through the recovery of the oil cost, and that was mentioned 
in Paragraph (11) of Article (31) of the production-sharing contract between the regional government 
and the company (marathon) stating that any value-added tax, is not refundable by the contractor 
under the law. The value-added tax is considered as the cost of petroleum, and it must be charged 
according to the provisions of Articles 1 and 25 of PSC. 
So according to the production-sharing contracts concluded, the contractor (exploration companies) 
are exempt from import and export taxes and the withholding tax applied additional profits, surface 
taxes and taxes, windfall profits. As for the subcontractor (service companies), it shall be exempt 
from import and export taxes and the withholding tax applied on any payments to it while according 
to the Oil and Gas Law in Paragraph (Second) of Article (40) exempts the contractor and not the 
subcontractor.But the question here is, based on what law did the Kurdistan Regional Government 
made a decision to exempt oil companies from production-sharing contracts? To respond to this 
question, because there is no law yet (as mentioned above, there is only a draft), one could argue that 
the regional government did not rely on any legal text to exempt oil companies from taxation, and 
the proof for this is that paragraph (2) of Article (40) of the Oil and Gas Law required relying on a 
special "law," and the obvious meaning of the word special "law" refers to a special "law" that 
exempts oil companies from taxation and issued by the legislative authority
26
. 
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However, it is noticeable that this law has not been issued yet despite the conclusion of about (57) 
production-sharing contracts and the exemption of most of the companies that concluded these 
contracts with them. All what KRG have is a bill for taxes on oil companies at the Parliament of 
Kurdistan, and even if this law were issued and it was decided to exempt from taxes, because the 
provisions of this law do not apply to contracts concluded previously based on the principle of non-
retroactivity of the law, according to the Iraqi constitution 2005, Article 19 the exceptions contained 
in the laws on this principle do not include the issue of taxes
27
.Final point to be submitted is that the 
Oil Gas Law paragraph  2   only contractor exempted for certain tax not subcontractor while in the 
PSC exempted all and this is clear breach of the lawsince there is a conflict between the contracts 
concluded in the Kurdistan Region with the oil and gas law in imposing types of taxes on the 
subcontractor, while in the contracts concluded, the subcontractor is imposed an income tax, personal 
and social security contributions, but this matter remains subject to the issuance of a special law that 
regulates how, conditions and cases of exemption of oil companies from taxes, and this on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, as for imposing types of taxes on the contractor (exploration 
companies), according to the production-sharing contracts concluded, income tax, personal income 
tax and social security contributions are imposed on them only without other types, while according 
to the Oil and Gas Law, all types of taxes are imposed on them, and here there is contradiction 
between the two. 
Legal Framework for Oil & Gas Taxation in Nigeria and Azerbaijan 
In some  countries suchasAzerbaijanandformer  Soviet republics,  oil  contractssuchas  oil  
production  sharing  contractswere  put  intolocallaw,  which  gives  morelegal  securityfor 
international oil  companies 
In some  countries suchasAzerbaijanandformer  Soviet republics,  oil  contractssuchas  oil  
production  sharing  contractswere  put  intolocallaw,  which  gives  morelegal  securityfor 
international oil  companies 
vIn some  countries suchasAzerbaijanandformer  Soviet republics,  oil  contractssuchas  oil 
Petroleum is considered a national asset in Nigeria's constitution 1999, with ownership vested in the 
Federal Government to administer for the entire country
28
. Because petroleum is the country's 
economic foundation. However, upstream oil and gas taxes differ from other forms of taxation in 
Nigeria. For examples, Oiland Gas taxes in Nigeria, are governed by four main legislations that 
differ depending on the nature and scope of the companies. To begin, the Petroleum Profit Tax Act 
(PPTA) of 2004 imposes a tax on the profits of any corporation involved in petroleum operations 
during the accounting period at a specified rate. It's important to note that the PPTA does not cover 
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all petroleum operations. Second, the Company Income Tax Act (CITA) of 2004 is utilized to tax oil 
and gas companies that engage in downstream operations, with the chargeable profit taxed at a rate 
of 30%. Third, under the Education Tax Act of 2004, this tax is levied at a fixed rate of two percent 
(2%) on all assessable revenues of all companies and it is paid in addition to corporate income tax.  
Finally, 2004 VAT (Value Added Tax), this is a tax on goods and services consumption. It can be 
thought of as a value-added tax levied during the manufacturing of products and services on vatable 
products and services, VAT is charged at a fixed rate of 7.5 percent
29
.As for Azerbaijan’sProduction 
Sharing Agreement (PSA),the Contractor carrying out activity related to petroleum operations in 
Azerbaijan should pay a profit tax, according to Azerbaijan's PSA. The interest rate is flexible and 
ranges from 20% to 32%. All imports made in connection with PSAs are exempt from customs taxes 
and VAT under the Customs Duties under PSAs. The State Customs Committee of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan can provide a certificate of exemption from import/export customs to contractors, 
operational companies, and their subcontractors. However, in order to claim the exemption, a 
contractor, operating company, or subcontractor importing goods in connection to a PSA should 
submit copies of its VAT and customs duties exemption certificates to the customs authorities. 
Otherwise, Article12 of Taxation states that each Contractor party shall pay profit tax in respect of its 
Hydrocarbon Activities in accordance with the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Taxation on Profit 
andcertaintypes of Income of Legal Entities, dated 9
th
of November1991, as enacted, and as generally 
applicable and in force in the Azerbaijan Republic in1993, and as amended by the provisions of this 
Contract (the "Profit Tax"). It is acknowledged that Double Tax Treaties shall have effect to give 
relief from Taxes
30
.It is a condition to Contractor Parties' obligations under this Contract that except 
for the Profit Tax obligation described in Article mentioned above, that the Contractor Parties shall 
not be subject to any existing or future Taxes of any nature whatsoever in respect of their 
Hydrocarbon Activities.For purposes of this Article 12, "Hydrocarbon Activities" shall be defined as 
all activities relating to Petroleum in the Azerbaijan Republic, whether such activities are performed 
in the Azerbaijan Republic or elsewhere. Furthermore, if a Contractor Party fails to file a final Profit 
Tax Return, it shall be liable for a penalty of one hundred and ten percent (110%) of the Profit Tax 
required to be paid with such Profit Tax return.Or if the amount of Profit Tax due as shown on the 
final profit tax return for a Calendar Year was understated due to fraud by the Contractor Party, it 
shall be liable for a penaltyof two hundred percent (200%) of the amount of the 
understatement.Nevertheless, the Azerbaijan Republic free of any Taxes and restrictions in their own 
name the following: all equipment, materials, machinery and tools, vehicles, spare parts, foodstuffs 
(subject to compliance with applicable 
regulationspertainingtotheimportoffoodstuffs),goodsandsuppliesnecessaryinContractor'sreasonable 
opinionfortheproperconductandachievementofthepetroleumoperations,provided,however,thatwith 
respect to the purchase thereof Contractor shall give preference to Azerbaijani suppliers in those 
cases in which such Azerbaijani suppliers are in all material respects competitive in price, quality 
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and availability with those available from other sources
31
.Notwithstanding private sales of imported 




Finally, when comparing the national laws and PSCs of the above-mentioned countries to the KRI’s 
Oil and Gas law and PSC, it appears that they are significantly more comprehensive, and that their 
tax exemptions are clearly stated and in accordance with their national statutes. Accordingly, KRI 
may learn from both of the aforementioned states in terms of cost recovery and taxation. Although, 
the Kurdistan Regional Government by exempting oil companies from taxes was a source of 
dissatisfaction with many civil society organizations that are concerned with oil and energy affairs in 
the Kurdistan Region, and author support this approach because attracting foreign investment in the 
Kurdistan Region, yet it is necessary not at the expense of its own citizen. Therefore, it was 
necessary to carefully restudy the exemption of oil companies from taxes by taking into account the 
experiences of other developed and developing countries, as this could be a viable solution to the 
region's crisis. 
production  sharing  contractswere  put  intolocallaw,  which  gives  morelegal  securityfor 
international oil  companies 
In some  countries suchasAzerbaijanandformer  Soviet republics,  oil  contractssuchas  oil  
production  sharing  contractswere  put  intolocallaw,  which  gives  morelegal  securityfor 
international oil  comp 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to compare fiscal regimes and how three oil-exporting countries 
manage their oil and gas resources using fiscal regime mechanisms. The three countries studied, 
namely Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Nigeria and Azerbaijan compared all adopt the Petroleum Sharing 
Contractual Fiscal system although with varying degrees of percentages across the classes of cost 
recovery and taxes. Overall, the study found that there are no standard limitations for implementing 
PSC Cost Recovery and tax administration in general, but that it is rather based on each country's 
policy and how it best serves their needs or the way attracts IOCs. As a result, petroleum fiscal 
regimes are dependent on resource facts that the IOC must examine if they wish to enter a country, 
and the country's attractiveness has a significant impact on the feasibility of the project and the IOC's 
project.Because countries compete for foreign investment to exploit their natural resources, they 
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compete with one another. To accomplish this, they must examine their position in the global 
economy, as well as their specific circumstance, boundary circumstances, concerns, and objectives. 
Therefore, it could be said that the Kurdistan Regional Government has been successful in attracting 
many IOCs by exempting oil companies from taxes, and the author supports this approach since 
attracting foreign investment in the Kurdistan Region is difficult and important, but in other hand, it 
must not be done at the expense of its own citizens, which is currently a source of dissatisfaction 
with many civil society organizations. This is because, while international oil corporations bear the 
highest risk in production sharing agreements, they typically benefit from them since they provide 
the foundation for optimal cost recovery and oil output. 
Finally, after comparing the cost recovery and taxation provisions of production sharing contracts in 
the Kurdistan region with those in other states, the researchers came to the conclusion that the KRI's 
cost recovery and taxation provisions require reform based on analysis and experience from other 
resource-rich countries in establishing well-designed stabilization funds for oil and gas revenues in 
which the KRI can benefited from. 
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